In this News Letter 2nd Edition of June 2026 you’ll find:
1. RATIO OF LATEST JUDGEMENTS ON GST
2. GST UPDATES
3. DUE DATES – GST COMPLIANCES IN JUNE 2026
RATIO OF LATEST JUDGEMENTS ON GST
POOJA RAMESH SINGH Vs JAMMU AND KASHMIR BANK LTD. & ANR. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11950 OF 2025 (Supreme Court)
The Appellant herein being the suspended director of the Essel Infraprojects Ltd. (“EIL”), which acted as the corporate debtor and corporate guarantor. The primary borrower was Pan India Utilities Distribution Company Ltd. (“PIUDCL”). PIUDCL availed specific loan facilities from J&K Bank Ltd. EIL executed a corporate guarantee to secure these credit facilities. Clause 8 of the guarantee deed explicitly stated that the guarantee would not be determined or prejudiced by any absorption or amalgamation of the guarantor company with any other company, remaining valid until the loan accounts were adjusted in the bank’s books. PIUDCL defaulted, leading its accounts to be classified as non-performing assets. J&K Bank Ltd filed a Section 7 application under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Mumbai, admitted the application on 28.08.2024, appointed an IRP, and declared a moratorium. The appellant appealed to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). NCLAT dismissed the appeal on 11.09.2025, affirming NCLT’s admission by citing multiple judicial precedents. During independent research or drafting, the NCLT relied heavily on six case citations. An independent review revealed that three citations were entirely non-existent, and the other three used genuine case names but contained completely fabricated, AI-generated legal text. J&K Bank Ltd confirmed its counsel never cited these cases at the bar.
The Petitioner herein argued that the citation and the text paragraphs relied upon the NCLT (and Subsequently by the NCLAT) were fake, non-existent, and AI-generated. Further, even where the case citations happened to match real case names, the excerpted legal rulings inside the paragraphs could not be traced to any genuine law reports. A judicial determination built upon unverified, hallucinated material amounts to a subversion of the rule of law and cannot be allowed to stand. Whereas, the respondents defending the core commercial merits of the case, asserted that debt and default were clearly established and the corporate guarantee was valid under Clause 8. J&K Bank Ltd filed an explicit affidavit proving that its own advocates did not present, cite, or introduce these fake precedents during oral or written arguments at the bar. The tribunal generated the material through its own independent, internal research errors.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court established a strict zero-tolerance policy for the Bench and the Bar regarding the citation or reliance on unverified, AI-generated fake material. Relying on fake precedents subverts the rule of law and strips away the lifeblood of fair judicial determination. Further explaining that any decision by an adjudicating authority based on fabricated, hallucinated material is “no decision in the eyes of the law”. If even an iota of fake material enters the decision-making process, the decision must be set aside immediately to protect judicial sanctity, regardless of whether that material directly or indirectly altered the outcome on its merits. Legal professionals can adopt AI tools to aid swift functioning, but absolute human oversight must be maintained at every stage to verify outputs.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside both the NCLT order dated 28.08.2024 and the NCLAT judgment dated 11.09.2025 due to systemic taint from the fake precedents. The Section 7 IBC application (RCP (IB) 6/MB/2023) was restored to its original number before the NCLT. The Supreme Court explicitly refrained from expressing any view on the factual merits. It directed the NCLT to rehear the application on its merits and clear it expeditiously, preferably within two weeks. The parties were ordered to maintain a strict status quo pending the final disposal of the restored application. The Bar Council of India was formally directed to set up a dedicated committee to prescribe regulatory principles and subsequent disciplinary consequences for advocates who present unverified AI hallucinations to courts.
MISHRA SECURITY SERVICES Vs STATE OF U.P. WRIT TAX NO. 715 OF 2026, (Allahabad High Court- Lucknow Bench)
The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking to quash a Show Cause Notice (SCN) dated March 17, 2025 and an Assessment Order dated June 4, 2025 as issued by the SGST Authorities. The petitioner initially filed a writ petition in January 2026 which was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty given to file a fresh petition with better particulars. The court did not address the merits or limitation aspects during that first round. The petitioner received the SCN, submitted a formal reply, and was afforded a personal hearing before the final assessment order was passed on June 4, 2025. The petitioner failed to file a statutory appeal within the prescribed timeframe. The subsequent writ petition was instituted nearly a year after the issuance of the assessment order.
The Petitioner argued that the statutory preconditions required to demand tax under Section 74 of the GST Act were entirely absent from both the SCN and the Final Assessment. Further asserting that the assessment order was completely devoid of legal jurisdiction. The Revenue on the other hand highlighted that the petitioner was given full opportunity to reply and was afforded a personal hearing. Consequently, no jurisdictional error or breach of natural justice occurred. Furthermore, it was asserted that the writ petition was an intentional strategy to circumvent the strict statutory limitation period for filing an appeal.
The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court observed that the Limitation laws in fiscal and tax matters must be strictly applied. High Courts will not widen these timelines if the legislature has deliberately capped the condonable period. Litigants cannot exploit writ jurisdiction to achieve indirectly what statutory bars prohibit directly (quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum). A writ cannot be used to make statutory timelines meaningless. Section 107 of the GST Act establishes a clear three-month window for appeals, plus a capped one-month extension for sufficient cause. This strict structure completely excludes Section 5 of the Limitation Act, leaving courts with zero authority to grant extra extensions. Writ remedies are discretionary and are unavailable to “fence-sitters” who sleep over their legal rights instead of pursuing them diligently.
The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petition without any order as to costs. The court held that because a reply was submitted and a personal hearing was given, no breach of natural justice or structural jurisdictional error existed. The belated writ was deemed an attempt to bypass the statutory remedy. The Hon’ble High Court granted the petitioner liberty to proceed in accordance with the law. It clarified that if a statutory appeal is filed, the appellate forum must decide the matter on its own merits without being influenced by the observations in this judgment.
DILIP BABUBHAI PATEL Vs STATE OF GUJARAT, R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 21685 OF 2019 (Gujarat High Court)
The petitioner herein manufactured wooden pallets & boxes, inputs were taxed at 15%, while finished goods were taxed at 5%, due to this inverted duty structure, an excess Input Tax Credit (ITC) of ₹23,74,689 accumulated as of June 30, 2017. On July 1, 2017, the petitioner carried forward this accumulated VAT credit into the GST regime via Form GST TRAN-1. It was credited to the petitioner’s Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL) under the State Goods and Services Tax (SGST) head. Under GST, inputs were taxed at 18% (9% CGST + 9% SGST), and finished goods were taxed at 12% (6% CGST + 6% SGST). This led to further credit accumulation. For the period July 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018 the total available ITC was ₹28,54,987 (which included the migrated transitional credit). The petitioner applied for an SGST refund of ₹23,50,000 in Form GST RFD-01A. The authority sanctioned ₹4,75,324 (pertaining to the regular GST period) but rejected the remaining ₹18,74,676. The rejection was on the grounds that the balance represented pre-GST transitional credit, which cannot be refunded under Section 54(3) of the GST Act due to the statutory bar under the second proviso to Section 142(3). Following the rejection, the department also failed to re-credit the rejected amount back to the petitioner’s ECL.
The Petitioner argued that once transitional credit is successfully transferred under Section 140, it becomes part of the ECL and merges into the continuous pool of available ITC. The statute does not explicitly bifurcate or distinguish between transitioned credit and GST-period credit for the purpose of denying refunds. Denying a refund of transitioned credit
leaves it permanently blocked in the ECL due to the continuous inverted tax structure, defeating the beneficial nature of Section 140. The second proviso to Section 142(3) is merely a safeguard to prevent double-dipping (i.e. claiming a refund under the old law while simultaneously carrying it forward under GST). It does not bar a refund under Section 54(3) once it resides in the GST pool. The department violated Rule 92(3) by rejecting the refund without issuing a show-cause notice or providing a personal hearing. It also violated Rule 93 by not re-crediting the rejected amount via Form GST PMT-03. Relied on Intas Pharmaceuticals, Torrent Pharmaceuticals, Ford India, and Weatherproof Solution to assert that transitional origin does not impede refund rights.
Whereas, the Revenue Contended that Chapter XX of the GST Acts forms a complete transitional code. Assessees have two distinct, mutually exclusive choices: either claim a cash refund under the old laws or carry it forward to the GST regime under Section 140. Once an assessee elects to carry forward the credit via TRAN-1, the statutory embargo under the second proviso to Section 142(3) is strictly triggered, making any subsequent cash refund impermissible. Merely reflecting the transitional credit in the ECL does not alter its original character or source as a pre-GST accumulation. Section 54(3) restricts inverted duty refunds strictly to ITC generated via inputs during the relevant GST period. Explanation (a) to Rule 89(5) restricts “Net ITC” to input tax credit availed on inputs during the relevant period, which excludes a transitioned opening balance. CBEC Circular No. 37/11/2018-GST explicitly clarifies that once CENVAT/VAT credit is transitioned under GST, no cash refund of such credit can be allowed.
The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court laid that there is a clear distinct legislative demarcation between the utilization and the refund of Input Tax Credit spanning the old and new tax regimes. Once pre-GST credit is transitioned into the GST framework via TRAN-1, it is available exclusively for output tax utilization under Section 49(4). The statutory bar under the second proviso to Section 142(3) explicitly restricts cash refunds of such transitioned credit. Taxpayers cannot switch between or pursue both pathways interchangeably. Refunds under Section 54(3) apply solely to ITC generated on inward supplies under the GST regime during the specific tax period. Transitioned credits do not qualify as “Net ITC” under Rule 89(5) as they were not availed during the tax period in question. When a challenge is purely a question of law and the parties have exhaustively articulated their legal arguments through pleadings, remanding the matter solely for a lack of a personal hearing is an “empty formality” and an exercise in futility. If a transitional credit refund is rejected, the department cannot pocket both the refund and the credit. Under Rule 93, the rejected credit must be restored and re-credited back to the ECL for future output tax utilization.
The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court held that the cases cited by the petitioner (Torrent Pharmaceuticals, Weatherproof Solution, Ford India) were distinguishable, as they either dealt with zero-rated supplies, recovery actions, or did not explicitly evaluate the applicability of the statutory bar under Section 142(3). The writ petition was partly allowed.
The petitioner’s claim for a cash refund of ₹18,74,676 was legally impermissible and rejected. The petitioner’s alternative prayer to re-credit the rejected amount to its Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL) was allowed. The Court directed the respondent authorities to examine the petitioner’s re-credit application, verify records, and pass an appropriate order under Form GST PMT-03 to restore the ₹18,74,676 to the ECL within 12 weeks for future utilization under Section 140.
STATE BANK OF INDIA Vs COMMERCIAL CGST & CENTRAL EXCISE W.P.A. NO. 433 OF 2026 (Calcutta High Court Jalpaiguri Bench)
The Petitioner i.e. State Bank of India (through its regional manager) received a composite Show-Cause Notice (SCN) dated June 25, 2025 issued by the Additional Commissioner under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017. The SCN clubbed multiple financial years together (from FY 2018-19 to FY 2023-24) regarding alleged IGST liabilities involving fraud. Prior to the notice, the bank provided 56 inter-branch invoices and documents up to March 2024 via email. Following the SCN, they filed a detailed reply with calculation worksheets and invoice-level details, while specifically objecting to the issuance of a single, consolidated SCN for multiple tax periods. On December 12, 2025 the adjudicating authority rejected the bank’s objection, citing a lack of invoices or supporting details. The Order-in-Original (OIO) confirmed a principal GST demand of ₹5,48,56,775, charged applicable interest, and imposed an equal 100% penalty, bringing the total aggregated liability to approximately ₹10,97,13,550. The Petitioner directly filed a writ petition to quash the composite SCN and the subsequent OIO.
The Petitioner contended that each financial year is an independent unit with its own separate limitation period. Clubbing years is an attempt by the department to enlarge the statutory limitation period and revive demands that are otherwise barred by time. The term “periods” in the statute must be read as a specific “tax period” linked to monthly or annual returns. Since returns cannot span multiple financial years, a single SCN cannot span multiple years. The department passed the order by ignoring vital documentary evidence submitted during both pre and post-show-cause stages, resulting in a violation of natural justice. Whereas, the department contended that the writ petition should be dismissed because the petitioner has an alternative, efficacious statutory remedy to appeal under Section 107. Moreover, determining whether items are barred by limitation or if the documents were properly considered involves a mixed question of fact and law, which requires a detailed fact-finding enquiry that a writ court should not conduct. Furthermore, in cases involving fraudulent benefits spread over several years, a consolidated show-cause notice is permissible in law.
The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court observed that under sub-Section (10) to Section 74 of the Act, the five-year limitation period is calculated specifically from the due date of furnishing the annual return “for the financial year” to which the tax relates. This clear language establishes each financial year as a separate and independent unit. A conjoint reading of the definitions of “tax period” (Section 2(106)) and “return” (Section 2(97)) means that a notice can only be based on a monthly return or an annual return for an entire year or part thereof. Because there is no provision to file a combined return for multiple financial years, multiple financial years cannot be bunched into a single notice. The revenue cannot use a consolidated notice to indirectly overcome the bar of limitation for older financial years. If a step must be done in a particular statutory manner and time frame, all other modes are expressly forbidden. While an alternative statutory remedy exists under Section 107, it does not act as an absolute bar if the authority commits a jurisdictional error that is ex-facie apparent on the face of the record without requiring a factual trial.
The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petition. The composite show-cause notice dated June 25, 2025, and the consequential order-in-original dated December 12, 2025, were declared illegal, devoid of jurisdiction, and stood quashed. The court did not rule on the factual merits of the tax liability but granted the revenue authorities liberty to proceed afresh strictly in accordance with the law.
SAMADHAN SEVA SAMITI Vs UNION OF INDIA, CIVIL WRIT JURISDICTION CASE NO. 945 OF 2026 (Patna High Court)
The Petitioner is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, operating in Bihar, and registered under the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The Petitioner delayed filing its quarterly returns (GSTR-3B and GSTR-1) due to the personal health issues of its accountant. The Respondent Department issued a Show Cause Notice (SCN) in Form GST-REG-17/31 by uploading it solely on the web portal under the heading “Additional Document and Order”. The SCN was never served via the petitioner’s e-mail or official address. The Respondent subsequently passed an ex-parte order on 23.09.2021 (bearing reference no. ZA100921095672K) cancelling the petitioner’s GST registration. The cancellation order contained a pre-written formatting error stating that the petitioner had replied on 19.08.2021, which the State later admitted was an incorrect format insertion. The Petitioner’s statutory appeal (Appeal Case No. AD100723003083W) was dismissed on 25.07.2025 by the Additional Commissioner (Appeal), Patna West Division, solely on the grounds of limitation.
The Petitioner Argued that SCN was never served via e-mail or physical address, resulting in a severe breach of natural justice and lack of a hearing. Furthermore, there was no pending tax amount against them, and the cancellation order was cryptic and non-speaking.
The Hon’ble Patna High Court held that merely uploading a show cause notice on the common portal under the heading “Additional Notice and Order” does not suffice as proper compliance with the principles of natural justice. It is mandatory for official respondents to comply with at least two of the service modes prescribed under Section 169 of the CGST/BGST Act, 2017. Non-compliance with this mandatory service requirement vitiates the entire cancellation proceeding. An appellate dismissal on the ground of limitation cannot stand if it completely ignores the underlying ex-parte character of the vitiated cancellation order
Thus, the Hon’ble Patna High Court allowed the writ application, setting aside both the Appellate dismissal order dated 25.07.2025 and the GST cancellation order dated 23.09.2021. The Court granted liberty to the respondents to proceed afresh against the petitioner and pass a reasoned order after strictly complying with the service requirements of Section 169 and Section 75(4) of the CGST/BGST Act, 2017, and offering an opportunity of a hearing. The Court strongly recorded its displeasure regarding the department’s use of a pre-written order format that contained false factual data and directed the Commissioner of State GST to issue a corrigendum to all communications where such a format was utilized.
AMAN SINGH Vs DIRECTOR GENERAL GOODS AND SERVICE TAX INTELLIGENCE (DGGI) MCRC NO. 3019 OF 2026 (Chhattisgarh High Court)
The Respondent (DGGI) alleged that M/s Hindustan Corporation, a proprietorship firm registered under the name of one Sanyasi Jagat, fraudulently availed and passed on Input Tax Credit (ITC) worth ₹7,59,25,127 without any underlying physical supply of goods. DGGI found that M/s Hindustan Corporation was non-operational. A search conducted at M/s Khyaati Enterprises (belonging to the applicant, Aman Singh) uncovered Sanyasi Jagat on the premises. Jagat gave a statement claiming the firm was set up on the applicant’s instructions. An accountant, Santosh Bhardwaj, stated he filed returns for the applicant’s firms using documents provided by the applicant. Bank records showed that M/s Khyaati Enterprises transferred approximately ₹4.93 crore to M/s Hindustan Corporation, with only ₹24.5 lakh returned, indicating no genuine business activity. The Applicant was arrested on March 14, 2026, at the Raipur airport after previously failing to comply with multiple investigative summons.
The Applicant argued that he is innocent, has been falsely implicated, and lacks connection with the alleged tax offence. There is no documentation establishing him as the legal owner or proprietor of M/s Hindustan Corporation; the registered proprietor is Jagat Sanyasi. The main accused (Jagat Sanyasi) was not arrested, yet the applicant was placed in custody. He has been in jail since March 14, 2026, and continuous detention violates his right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Whereas, the Respondent argued that the accountant’s statement shows the applicant controlled and supplied data for M/s Khyati Enterprises, M/s Hindustan Corporation, and M/s Samriddhi Trading. Bank transactions worth crores between the entities show operational management and financial control by the applicant without underlying business trade. The applicant intentionally evaded summons, absconded, and only admitted to handling invoices, WhatsApp records, and GST filings after being intercepted at the airport. Given the gravity and organized nature of the ₹7.59 crore scam, bail should be rejected.
The Hon’ble Chhattisgarh High Court observed that at the stage of considering bail, the court cannot conclusively adjudicate whether circumstantial material, financial transactions, and third-party statements are sufficient to prove conscious involvement, beneficial ownership, or criminal intent (mens rea). When the legal proprietorship belongs to another individual, no unimpeachable documents place ownership on the applicant, the investigation has substantially progressed, and documents/electronic evidence are already seized, extended custody or custodial interrogation is unnecessary. The Hon’ble High Court allowed the first bail application and granted regular bail to Aman Singh without commenting on the merits of the case. The applicant is ordered to be released upon furnishing a personal bond of ₹1,00,000 with one solvent surety to the satisfaction of the concerned trial court.
GURU AND CO. Vs UNION OF INDIA (2026) 43 CENTAX 433 (MAD.) (Madras High Court)
The petitioners supply pulses (such as Moong Dhal and Thoor Dhal) under brand names not registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 or the Copyright Act, 1957. Under original GST Notifications No. 1/2017-Central Tax (Rate) and No. 2/2017-Central Tax (Rate), food grains supplied in unit containers were subject to 5% GST only if they carried a “registered brand name”. Unregistered brands were exempt. Many assessees began de-registering their brands to escape tax while continuing to use the same brand names. This was debated at the 21st GST Council meeting. The 21st GST Council recommended adding conditions to the definition of a registered brand name, specifically deeming a brand registered if a “mark or name in respect of which actionable claim is available”. The Central and State Governments subsequently issued amending Notifications (No. 27/2017 and No. 28/2017 Central/Integrated Tax (Rate), and Tamil Nadu G.O.(Ms) No. 114). These notifications expanded the tax net by inserting the phrase “actionable claim or enforceable right in a court of law”. Armed with these notifications, authorities issued show-cause notices to the petitioners. In its 22nd meeting, the GST Council purported to ratify the issued notifications as a whole, including the drafting changes. The petitioners moved the High Court to challenge the validity of these notifications and the subsequent show-cause notices.
The Petitioner argued that the statutory notifications issued under Sections 9 and 11 must strictly mirror and conform to the GST Council’s actual recommendations. The insertion of the phrase “enforceable right in a court of law” was completely unauthorized as it exceeded the scope of what was approved at the 21st GST Council meeting. The notifications violate Article 279A of the Constitution of India and undermine cooperative federalism
Whereas, the Respondents argued that the GST Council recommendations are not binding in a way that requires the government to reproduce a strict “mirror view” in final notifications. The notifications simply captured the true intent and objective sought by the 21st GST Council meeting. Any drafting discrepancies or expansions made by the Central Government were later corrected and validly ratified by the GST Council during its 22nd meeting.
The Hon’ble Madras High Court observed that Government notifications under Sections 9 and 11 constitute subordinate legislation. Since the Government is legally bound by GST Council recommendations when making rules under Section 164, it is by clear implication equally bound when issuing statutory notifications under Sections 9 and 11. The terms “actionable claim” and “enforceable right in a court of law” are not synonymous; the latter has a much wider scope. By adding “enforceable right in a court of law”, the government acted without any supporting Council recommendation. Unilaterally casting aside or exceeding the combined wisdom of the Council defeats the very purpose of the GST structure and harms cooperative federalism. The power of the GST Council is strictly confined to making “recommendations” under Article 279A of the Constitution. It holds no explicit or implied powers of review or ratification. The principle of ratification is entirely alien to statutory and constitutional frameworks of this nature. Because the expanded notifications were issued without a prior recommendation, they were ab initio void and could not be retrospectively validated or given life by a subsequent ratification.
The Hon’ble High Court allowed the writ petitions and declared the impugned Central and State notifications ultra vires the parent statute insofar as they incorporate the expression “enforceable right in a court of law”. Without this specific phrase, the remaining portions of the notifications are held intra vires. The purported ratification by the GST Council in its 22nd meeting was held to be entirely without jurisdiction. The impugned show-cause notices issued to the petitioners were set aside. The department was granted liberty to issue fresh show-cause notices strictly within the validly sustained bounds of the notifications. No costs were awarded.
GST UPDATES-
- Extension of date as 31st day of July, 2026 for filing of 2nd Appeal or Applications before GSTAT:
The Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) in Notification dated 30th June 2026, S.O. 350(E) exercising the powers conferred by sub-section (1) read with sub-section (3) of section 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017) and in supersession of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue number S.O. 4220(E), dated the 17 September, 2025, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 3, Sub-section (ii),except as respects things done or omitted to be done before such supersession, the Government, on the recommendations of the Council, hereby notifies the 31st day of July, 2026, as the date up-to which appeal or application, as the case may be, may be filed before the Appellate Tribunal under this Act in respect of all cases where the order sought to be appealed against, —
- is communicated to the person preferring the appeal before the 1st day of May, 2026, and all appeals in respect of order communicated on or after 1st May, 2026, may be filed before the Appellate Tribunal as provided in sub-section (1) of section 112 within three months from the date on which such order is communicated;
- is passed before the 1st day of February, 2026, and all applications in respect of orders passed on or after 1st February, 2026 may be filed before the Appellate Tribunal as provided in sub-section (3) of section 112 within six months from the date on which the said order has been passed.
- Clarification regarding Jurisdiction in cases Involving Migration/ Transfer of Taxable Persons:
CBIC in Circular No. 255/01/2026-GST dated 25/06/20126 laid clarification regarding jurisdiction in cases involving migration/ transfer of taxable persons from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction —
- Where any action or proceeding under the CGST Act and the rules made thereunder has been validly undertaken by the transferor jurisdictional authority having jurisdiction over the registered taxpayer on the date such action was undertaken, the same shall remain valid notwithstanding the subsequent migration/ transfer of the taxable person to another jurisdictional authority. The transferee jurisdictional authority shall act upon, give effect to, and proceed on the basis of such earlier valid action taken by the transferor jurisdictional authority, as if it had itself initiated the same.
- The transferor jurisdiction authority shall not take any action or initiate proceedings against the taxable person, after he has migrated/ transferred to another jurisdiction and any issue that comes to the notice of the transferor jurisdictional authority should be intimated to the transferee jurisdictional authority for any further action.
- Where the taxable person migrates to another jurisdiction during the pendency of any action or proceeding initiated by the transferor jurisdictional authority, the transferee jurisdictional authority shall take over and conclude the same from the stage at which it stood at the time of migration/ transfer, and shall be competent to take all further actions, including consequential proceedings that might arise therefrom. Thus, the transferee jurisdictional authority shall be the competent authority to give effect to, implement, or act upon any such action already taken, and also to act upon any consequential action arising from the antecedent proceedings, including representing, defending, or otherwise conducting proceedings, filing of appeals before the appellate authority or appellate tribunal, in cases involving migration/transfer of the taxable person.
Disclaimer: Pursuant to the Bar Council of India rules, we are not permitted to solicit work and advertise. You, the reader acknowledges that there has been no advertisement, personal communication, solicitation, invitation or inducement of any sort whatsoever from us or any of our members to solicit any work through this newsletter. The information provided in this newsletter is solely available at your request and is for informational purposes only, it should not be interpreted as soliciting or advisement. We are not liable for any consequence of any action taken by the reader relying on material/ information provided in the newsletter. In cases where the reader has any legal issues, he/she must in all cases seek independent legal advice. Any information obtained or materials used from this newsletter is completely at the reader’s volition and any transmission, receptor use of the contents of this newsletter would not create any lawyer-client relationship.
© 1981-2026 Sharnam Legal, All rights reserved